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Reviews of American Sämoa, French
Polynesia, Niue, Sämoa, Tokelau, and
Tuvalu are not included in this issue. 
Cook Islands
For the Cook Islands, the period July
2001 to June 2002 was dominated by
continued population decline, unpop-
ular political party switches by mem-
bers of parliament, cabinet shuffles
and reshuffles, dengue fever, flooding,
ten-year high inflation, land contro-
versies, and immigration concerns.
Political events in the country’s capi-
tal, Rarotonga, marked a year of
major challenges for its democratically
elected government, great political and
reorganization disappointments, and a
few guarded economic successes.
The country’s two banks, Cook
Islands Savings Bank and Cook Islands
Development Bank, merged as the
Bank of the Cook Islands (CIN, 2 July
2001, 1), and welcomed its first cus-
tomer on 4 August 2001. As the new
bank became an important arm of
government for many financial trans-
actions, some public servants increas-
ingly complained of being on the same
annual salary of nz$11,000 for ten
years. They argued that disparities
within the public service reflected a
fundamentally unfair system. Cook
Islanders generally observed that too
much was being paid to heads of min-
istries, whose salaries ranged between
nz$45,000 and nz$80,000 a year.
Public Service Commissioner Jonah
Tisam received little support when he
pointed out that no public servant
was overpaid; rather, those on the
lower scales were being underpaid
(CIN, 3 July 2001, 1). Considering
that inflation in the small nation was
hitting a ten-year high, government
workers who were generally on a
lower scale felt most of the pinch. The
cost of a loaf of sliced white bread
was reported as rising (in nz dollars)
from $2.80 to $4.20, and French
bread sticks from $1.20 to $2.40
(CIN, 9 Feb 2002, 1). Economists
predicted that prices would rise even
further, while describing the govern-
ment’s B rating by Standard & Poor
as meaning that the country’s eco-
nomic outlook was fair (CIN, 8 Sept
2001, 1).
Open criticism of the public ser-
vice compensation system continued
throughout the year and extended 
to the superannuation system, which
needed much improvement. By con-
trast, the country’s parliamentary
superannuation system was well estab-
lished and overgenerous despite a par-
liamentary select committee’s report
calling for an urgent overhaul of for-
mer parliamentarians’ superannuation
payments because of the cost to the
country. The government matches 
the parliamentarians’ contribution 
of 10 percent from salary, but payout
eligibility occurs after only eight years
of continued service. This contrasts
starkly with the much longer service
required in the public service or
private sector. The parliamentarian
scheme alone cost the government
nz$525,000 in the 2001–2002 finan-
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cial year. Other costs reflected parlia-
ment and government’s continued
appointment of assistant ministers
under the new, disguised title of
“undersecretary.” For a small country,
there were clearly too many parlia-
mentary representatives and too many
cabinet ministers, and certainly there
was no need for assistant ministers.
Although the general public was con-
vinced of this, politicians seemed
oblivious to their concerns.
The public outcry about politicians
fell on deaf ears. Indeed, cabinet even
contemplated increasing the number
of ministers to 9, which meant that
out of a full parliament of 25 mem-
bers, 18 (or 72 percent) of the House
would be either ministers or assistant
(undersecretary) ministers. Even the
current 6 cabinet members (48 percent
of the House) must be among the
highest in the world relative to the size
of the legislature and the population
as a whole. Apparently the proposed
change could not be justified without
infringing on the responsibilities of
senior administrative department
heads.
Proposals such as this seem to 
the public to disguise crude bids for
increased salaries and extensive travel
privileges; free use of government
vehicles, telephones, furnished houses;
as well as free use of government
laborers, and the opportunity to offer
work opportunities to constituent sup-
porters. The fact that most ministries
were reported to have failed to file
legally required reports to parliament
during the year supported a general
sense of their inefficiency and lack of
accountability. Cook Islanders are also
constantly reminded of the nation’s
debt of around nz$121.3 million,
which will take at least twenty-five
years to pay off (CIN, 17 Aug 2001, 1).
Much of that debt accumulated from
the legacy of the multimillion-dollar
Sheraton luxury hotel project—now
frequently referred to as the Vaima-
‘anga “on-again-off-again” project
(CIN, 21 Feb 2002, 1). 
A new nz$400,000 tugboat, Toa,
was launched in July 2001, at the
same time questions were being raised
by the general public about govern-
ment waste. Government spending for
1999–2000 represented 41 percent of
the nz$36 million total ministry bud-
get. The 1 July 2000 to 30 June 2001
period fared no better (CIN, 6 July
2001, 1). Increased government spend-
ing was predicted to total nz$54 mil-
lion, with the total budget expected to
exceed nz$75 million (CIN, 31 July
2001, 1). The Cook Islands Chamber
of Commerce noted that government
expenditure had increased by 20 per-
cent over the past two years (CIN, 13
April 2002, 1). Ironically, some cham-
ber members also expressed anger that
marketing dollars for the tourism
industry had been cut. Linked with
tourism were proposed developmental
projects, including alterations to the
Rarotonga airport terminal expected
to cost up to nz$9.5 million.
The largest industry, tourism, con-
tinued to maintain its prominent posi-
tion during the year, despite the legacy
of the September 11th attacks in the
United States. A national memorial 
on Maire Nui Drive for the September
11th attack victims reflected the coun-
try’s general support for the United
States. However, there was a drop in
US and European visitors, most com-
ing through Los Angeles. Some visi-
tors were stranded on Rarotonga by
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the US ban on flights, and more than
300 visitors later experienced the same
thing after Canada 3000 grounded 
all its flights and later declared bank-
ruptcy. Some 74,541 people still vis-
ited the Cook Islands in 2001 com-
pared to the record-breaking 72,994
in year 2000 (CIN, 14 Jan 2002, 1).
The target set by the Cook Islands
Tourism Corporation for 2005 had
already been broken by 2000. Visitor
counts were expected to continue to
rise with the completion of new tour-
ist accommodations, including the
large Aitutaki Pacific luxury resort
scheduled to open in October 2002.
On the surface, the booming industry
appeared to benefit local residents.
However, many tourist-related work
positions were filled by workers from
overseas. The importation of labor
was encouraged by some assistant
ministers, who accused Cook Islanders
leaving the islands of being just plain
lazy—all 4,000-plus of them. 
Local resident Professor Ron Cro-
combe suggested that Cook Islanders
often leave because they lack confi-
dence in the government (CIN, 12 July
2001, 1). The high cost of living in the
Cook Islands, with prices more than
people can afford, adds much to the
incentive to move out. Although the
government acknowledged a continu-
ing huge decline (with the population
estimated to have decreased to 13,900
from some 18,000 a few years earlier),
leaders still expressed other priorities.
Cabinet even dropped a campaign
designed to lure islanders home (CIN,
23 Feb 2002, 1). The assistant minis-
ter declared that those who do not
want to work in the country were
fleeing the country to live off benefits
in New Zealand, an explanation that
ignores poor salary conditions in an
increasingly expensive environment,
the lack of effective unions for work-
ers, and a tendency for national politi-
cians to lash out at the media for crit-
icizing official policy and action. 
During 2001–2002 wide public
concerns increased over the number
of permanent residents being allowed
into the country. Some foreigners have
even been openly accused of coming
into the Cook Islands with nothing in
their pockets. “Like parasites they are
sucking the small facilities that are
available in our backs as resources 
for themselves,” reflected mp Norman
George (CIN, 25 Aug 2001, 1). George
also suggested that lax policies toward
foreigners led to increased numbers of
foreign investors operating in the Cook
Islands. No safeguards exist for local
businesses, and reduced opportunities
tend to fuel out-migration. George
favored revoking the right of the Cook
Islands Development Investment
Board to grant immigration permits,
leaving that responsibility to the immi-
gration officers alone. George also
favored setting up a watchdog organi-
zation to protect jobs, businesses, and
land rights for the people of the Cook
Islands, to be called the Society for
the Promotion and Advancement for
the Cook Islands Employment and
Business (CIN, 1 Sept 2001, 1).
The once larger agriculture industry
had now clearly slipped in earnings,
although pawpaw, nono (or noni ),
maile, and other products continued
as notable exports. New challenges to
the industry during the year included
a coconut moth that invaded coconut
trees in Rarotonga, making the trees
brown and tarnished. The government
declared a biological war on the flat
coconut moth, involving the use of
bio-agents that are natural enemies 
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of the moth (CIN, 19 July 2001, 1).
However, efforts to constrain the
problem in Rarotonga seemed hope-
less, and by June 2002 the moth had
spread to the outer islands. The arrival
of the Queensland fruit bat was also
feared as a potential natural disaster
that could wipe all fruit growing in
the Cook Islands. Added to that was
tropical storm Trina, which brought
five days of floods and wind. The
island of Mangaia was particularly
hard hit by the storm, which wrecked
the island’s taro crop.
The pearl industry is now the third
largest industry in the Cook Islands,
with pearl farmers expecting a further
boost in production. Although subject
to quality control standards, internal
competition, and climatic changes, the
industry continued to do better than a
steadily growing local fishing industry.
Industry leaders are also becoming
increasingly mindful of the rich poten-
tial offered by seabed mining resources
within Cook Islands waters. However,
as American Samoan politician Eni
Faleomavaega Hunkin observed at 
the 7th Pacific Islands Conference on
Nature Conservation and Protected
Areas held in the Cook Islands in
2002, seabed mining could be a
future source of international conflict.
Political attention too often focused
on the established offshore banking
industry. The wall of secrecy sur-
rounding these activities had its chal-
lenges too, and the government now
regards loosening its secrecy laws as
vital to the continuing success of the
industry. Even with the proposed
internal changes, the Cook Islands
still remained on the Financial Action
Task Force blacklist (CIN, 11 Feb
2002, 1).
Government activity in the inter-
national arena showed some success.
A Center for Development of Enter-
prise was established as part of Euro-
pean Union “antennae” to the Cook
Islands. Although involving only a
part-time position, this development
represented Cook Islands’ acceptance
into African Caribbean Pacific mem-
bership in 2000, after twenty years 
of lobbying. Project proposals by
local Cook Islands organizations
could now be processed, with an
individual ceiling of €15,000 or about
nz$3,000,000 per year (CIN, 5 July
2001, 1). By 17 January 2002, the
European Community Head of Dele-
gation had presented his credentials 
to the Cook Islands Head of State,
Queen’s Representative Mr Fred
Goodwin.
During the same period, Cook
Islander Francis Topa-Apera was
chosen to lead the region’s Pacific
Foundation for the Advancement of
Women, and Rohan Ellis was selected
to head the Pacific Islands Forum’s
Beijing office. New Zealand citizen-
ship remained the single most impor-
tant issue to the Cook Islands, and
the practice of shared citizenship is
expected to continue. An international
conflict was avoided after an overzeal-
ous un information officer, Angelique
Doureihi, incorrectly named the Cook
Islands as a shipment point for illegal
drugs bound for Australia. The dam-
aging allegation was distributed
throughout the region via pacnews.
When asked by the Cook Islands to
clarify her accusation, she apologized
and blamed the reporter on the radio
program where the story was first
aired (CIN, 2 March 2002, 1).
The year 2001–2002 saw the
reemergence of a controversy over an
alternative cancer treatment facility
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established by Dr Milan Brych in the
1970s. This time the issue involved
the neglect of the graves of some for-
mer patients who came to the Cook
Islands when Dr Brych was no longer
able to practice in New Zealand (CIN,
6 July 2001, 1). Other health issues
involved stinging criticism of the local
national hospital staff and their treat-
ment of a tourist. Nevertheless, visit-
ing New Zealand Health Minister
Annette King declared that the Cook
Islands health service rivaled that of
similarly populated areas in her coun-
try (CIN, 14 Jan 2002, 1). Such accla-
mations could not prevent the dengue
fever that struck Rarotonga at the
same time the island was hit by flood-
ing. As cases increased, the Ministry of
Health urged a major cleanup to fight
the mosquitoes that spread dengue. A
few tourists contract the disease, and
in February 2002 differences devel-
oped between the minister of health
and the mayor of Mangaia, who
wanted to isolate his island (about
110 miles south of Rarotonga) to 
stop the fever from coming in. By the
beginning of March dengue fever had
reached Manihiki Atoll, an island
much further from Rarotonga.
The national hospital again came
to the fore as the parents of the late
John Atuatika queried the death of
their son and searched for his medical
records at the Health Ministry (CIN,
6 March 2002, 1). Atuatika’s body
was exhumed for a postmortem, the
first time this had occurred in the
Cook Islands in the context of an
inquest. A proposal by Auckland-
based Diatranz, Ltd., to conduct tests
on humans using pig cells also
received international attention and
concern (CIN, 4 March 2002, 1).
Meanwhile Health Secretary Tupu
Araiti successfully lobbied for a law
encouraging cremations, claiming that
this was in line with a public move
away from the practice of burials. 
The Cook Islands political leader-
ship crisis remerged in the middle of
July 2001 with rumors of new coali-
tions, mp realignments, and leaked
reports of conflicts in cabinet. In the-
ory the three main political parties
were the Cook Islands Party (cip),
Democratic Alliance Party (dap), and
New Alliance Party (nap). In reality,
party membership was more for elec-
tion purposes, and individual mem-
bers of parliament felt free to shift at
will. The New Alliance Party and the
Democratic Alliance Party had merged
at one point, but when dissatisfied
former dap members wanted to return
to their old party, they realized that
they had lost the name legally and
had to consider returning to the
Democratic Party. Even though the
Westminster parliamentary system
was proving inadequate for the Cook
Islands, sitting members were not
inclined to make any real changes, 
a disappointment to many electors.
Subsequently there was much public
apathy when the Cook Islands News
predicted a change of government
with a new coalition between Dr
Robert Woonton and Sir Geoffrey
Henry (CIN, 21 July 2001, 1). This
was to be the fourth coalition since
the 1992 general election.
Apathy toward political leadership
extended to parliament as an institu-
tion when the normally stable position
of parliamentary speaker became a
political maneuvering tool. Longtime
senior public servant Joe Cafferey
turned down the request to serve as
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Speaker of the House for one day and
then resign to pave the way for Dr
Pupuke Robati (CIN, 23 July 2001, 1).
The process eventually took place
with Harmon Pou Arere substituting
for Cafferey. “Mickey Mouse,” “polit-
ical farce,” “comical exercise,” and
“stupidity” were some of the com-
ments directed at these government
actions. The cost to taxpayers for the
two-and-a-half hours of Harmon Pou’s
work was estimated to be more than
nz$6,000 (CIN, 18 Aug 2001, 1).
Almost immediately after the
Speaker fiasco, Prime Minister Dr
Terepai Maoate sacked Deputy Prime
Minister Norman George and took
over all portfolios (CIN, 27 July 2001,
1). Unfortunately the timing of the
sacking loomed over the national
constitutional celebrations known 
as Maire Maeva Nui, disappointing
many members of the public. Curi-
ously, though, a quick street survey 
by the Cook Islands News suggested
that few respondents were sympa-
thetic to George’s predicament. With
Mr George sacked, Dr Maoate con-
firmed Dr Robert Woonton as his 
new deputy prime minister. Woonton
warned that one or two senior officials
in the prime minister’s department
were not carrying out government pol-
icy, and that their actions could lead
to a reshuffle in the government (CIN,
4 July 2001, 1). He also suggested
that “Promises of political reform and
transparency were not being lived up
to,” a statement rebuffed by Prime
Minister Maoate (CIN, 5 July 2001, 1).
Rumors of back-seat maneuvers
continued as overseas member of par-
liament Dr Joe Williams declared that
he had been ordered to stop a coup
(CIN, 11 Aug 2001, 1). Prime Minister
Maoate added to the perplexity when
he labeled the previous two years as
confusing, a reference to attempts to
transfer central government functions
to the outer islands (CIN, 12 Sept
2001, 1). He was alluding to a grow-
ing management and accountability
conflict between local and national
administration. After a five-month
break, parliament finally met, but
their first session lasted only ninety
minutes (CIN, 2 Feb 2002, 1). Not
long after 12 Feb 2002, the deputy
prime minister ousted his boss Dr
Maoate as prime minister. Within 
ten days of his administration taking
office, new Prime Minister Dr Robert
Woonton promised to remove import
levies, introduce a health insurance
scheme, pursue full un membership,
and review benefits and basic wages
(CIN, 13 Feb 2002, 1). New govern-
ment ministers were sworn in 13
February 2002, and the Cook Islands
had their fourth government since 
the 1999 general elections. Continued
apathy or increased opposition seems
likely as the country approaches the
general elections in two years’ time. 
jon tikivanotau m jonassen
Reference
CIN, Cook Islands News. Rarotonga.
Daily.
Hawaiian Issues
On 17 January 1893, the monarchy
of Hawai‘i was deposed by a group
who “represented the American and
European sugar planters, descendents
of missionaries and financiers” (US
Public Law 103-150). With the aid 
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of the United States minister, John L
Stevens, and US military forces, they
were able to deliver Hawai‘i into the
hands of the US federal government.
In a case of historical déjà vu, it seems
the same adversaries from a century
ago have now been reincarnated and
are attacking what is left of native
rights in Hawai‘i.
Since the 1970s there has been
slow, deliberate progress in raising
public awareness of Hawai‘i’s unique
history, culminating in the “Apology
Bill” (US Public Law 103-150) of
1993, a formal apology by the US
government to the Hawaiian people.
However, a shift toward a more con-
servative political climate under the
new Bush administration, beginning
in November 2001, and the hyperpa-
triotism inspired by September 11th,
have fueled vigorous attacks on native
Hawaiian rights and entitlements.
These renewed attacks have prompted
leaders of the Hawaiian independence
movement to stress the need for a sta-
ble, protected path toward self-deter-
mination. 
The Office of Hawaiian Affairs
(oha) and the Department of Hawai-
ian Homelands (dhhl) are two of the
most highly targeted agencies run by
the State of Hawai‘i. Since its incep-
tion in 1978, the Office of Hawaiian
Affairs has served as a liaison agency
between the native Hawaiian people
and the State of Hawai‘i. In that
capacity, the office manages Hawaiian
trust assets and entitlements, such as
land and money, and programs for
housing and education. As the benefi-
ciaries of this trust, those of Hawaiian
ancestry alone elect the oha trustees
and have a say in issues relevant to
the trust. The Department of Hawai-
ian Homelands was established as
part of the Hawaiian Homes Com-
mission Act in 1921, which set aside
200,000 acres of land for native
Hawaiian homesteading. Both of
these agencies exist in an effort to
address the needs and concerns of the
Hawaiian people who suffered the
loss of a nation.
Prior to the conservative shift in the
US federal government, the stage was
already being set by local challenges
to the Office of Hawaiian Affairs. In
1996, Harold “Freddy” Rice, a non-
Hawaiian rancher and businessman,
was turned away after requesting a
ballot to vote in oha elections. On
this refusal, Rice sought legal recourse,
accusing the state government of vio-
lating his civil rights. Claiming that
the Hawaiians-only policy reserved
for the Office of Hawaiian Affairs by
the state government was racist, he
sought its abolishment. The infamous
case quickly went up the judicial hier-
archy and was finally heard by the US
Supreme Court in early 2000. This
time the justices of the Supreme Court
agreed with Rice and his legal team,
and in February 2000, the US Supreme
Court opened voting in oha elections
to non-Hawaiians. Fortunately, the
court confined its ruling to the voting
practices of the State of Hawai‘i and
did not make any further determina-
tions regarding native entitlements.
However, any sense of relief over the
narrow ruling was tinged with feelings
of dread as the case set a dangerous
precedent.
Immediately following the Rice v
Cayetano ruling various anti–native
rights groups filed lawsuits challeng-
ing the very existence of the Office of
Hawaiian Affairs, the Department of
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Hawaiian Homelands, and more
broadly, any programs meant to assist
Hawaiians. John Carroll, Patrick Bar-
rett, and most recently, Earl Arakaki
are among the plaintiffs rotating the
lead on lawsuits threatening native
Hawaiian agencies and entitlements.
While these lawsuits originate out-
side the Hawaiian community, the July
2002 admission of a non-Hawaiian
student to the Kamehameha Schools,
a private institution that offers quality
education to Hawaiian children,
seemed to relocate the threat to the
boardroom of a Hawaiian trust insti-
tution. Citing legal challenges to the
school’s tax-exempt status as a reli-
gious institution, and its policy of pref-
erence for Hawaiian children, the
Kamehameha trustees admitted a
non-Hawaiian student to the Maui
campus, despite a waiting list of
dozens of Hawaiian children. The
Hawaiian community, which sees the
Kamehameha Schools as one of the
few remaining, distinctly Hawaiian
strongholds, was outraged by the
decision. The demands of alumni,
students, and many others in the
Hawaiian community ranged from
requests for explanations and apolo-
gies to outright calls for trustees’ res-
ignations. Seeking a solution would
be simpler if the trustees’ decision was
seen as an isolated incident, but it is
not. Rather, it is one more symptom
of a larger problem of native entitle-
ments sliding away. 
In the midst of this rapidly eroding
landscape, enter US Senator Daniel
Akaka and his bill for federal recogni-
tion of a “Hawaiian Governing
Entity.” Introduced in 1999, this was
an immediate response to the Rice v
Cayetano case and the need to rectify
and clarify the relationship between
the US government and the Hawaiian
people, as well as to protect the one
hundred or more federally funded pro-
grams and agencies that assist Hawai-
ians. It was meant to provide a “pro-
cess for the recognition by the United
States of the Native Hawaiian Gov-
erning Entity” and to create “an
avenue for federal recognition of a
Native Hawaiian Government parallel
to the existing petition process for
Native Americans” (Kanehe 2001,
863). Heralded as the “most viable
antidote to the feared unraveling of
entitlements for Hawaiians” (Boyd
2000, 8), the “Akaka bill,” as it has
come to be known, may turn out to
be nothing more than a Band-Aid 
on a gushing head wound. The
controversial bill has gone through
several drafts and amendments, the
latest of which is currently stalled in
US Congress.
Passage of the bill would establish
a relationship between a Native
Hawaiian Governing Entity and the
US government by establishing an
office within the US Department of
the Interior to focus on native Hawai-
ian issues and to serve as a liaison
agency between native Hawaiians and
the federal government, and establish-
ing an interagency coordinating group
to be composed of representatives of
the federal agencies that administer
programs and implement policies
impacting native Hawaiians (US
Senate 2001).
Proponents of the bill also regard 
it as a stepping-stone toward indepen-
dence. As efforts progress, they hope
the legislation would eventually lead
to secession from the United States.
The Native Alaskans recently received
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federal recognition from the United
States and are encouraging native
Hawaiians to pursue the recognition
avenue. While Alaskan recognition has
not been ideal, it has nevertheless pre-
served their entitlements and provided
a platform for further development of
their self-determination. 
While sponsors of the Akaka bill
stress its defensive assets, opponents
of the bill believe that we must be on
the offensive and forcefully pursue
international avenues. They view 
the Akaka bill as an “impediment to
achieving independent status” under
international law. In the eyes of a col-
onizing government, it may very well
be seen as a settlement and cripple all
other efforts in the international arena.
While the bill may afford temporary
legal protection for native programs
and entitlements, they say the price 
is too high. By being recognized as
Native Americans by the US govern-
ment, the Känaka Maoli risk giving
up their identity and extinguishing
any chance of independence through
the United Nation’s decolonization
process. Many advocates of Hawaiian
independence remind us that the King-
dom of Hawai‘i still exists despite for-
eign occupation. Thus, as an internal
US legislation, the Akaka bill has no
bearing on kingdom law.
A second category of opponents 
to the Akaka bill includes those who
made the measure necessary. Rice,
Arakaki, and other members of
anti–affirmative action groups, such
as Campaign for a Color-Blind Amer-
ica, disapprove of any native entitle-
ments and dismiss them as racist.
Despite history, these groups equate
the Office of Hawaiian Affairs, the
Kamehameha Schools, and actions
like the Akaka bill with “apartheid”
and “ethnic cleansing” and claim 
that no reparations are owed to the
Hawaiian people.
It is ironic that the Rice v Cayetano
case consolidated the efforts of various
sovereignty advocates, while the
Akaka bill has effectively divided
Hawaiians. The silver lining in the
cloud threatening to eclipse native
Hawaiian entitlements, however, is
the generation of political discussions
and choices on a scale larger than
ever before. As local legal challenges
to agencies such as the Office of
Hawaiian Affairs, Department of
Hawaiian Homelands, and the Kame-
hameha Schools increase, the federal
recognition bill is more and more
tempting to opponents despite its
shortfalls. The Alaskan natives have
reiterated their solicitation of federal
recognition, saying that the first bill
passed regarding their recognition was
not ideal either, but it provided semi-
autonomy over their lands and assets
as well as protection from opponents
to native rights. So, the Känaka Maoli
of Hawai‘i now stand at another criti-
cal crossroad in Hawaiian history: to
support or oppose federal recognition
in the face of multiplying legal attacks.
Whether we make the choice to
extol the protective properties of 
the Akaka bill or disregard it for its
wavering loyalties, the goal remains
the same. We must proceed with
assertive wisdom and use every
resource to pin down self-determina-
tion in spite of the efforts of our
adversaries in the US legal system,
international arenas, and hedonistic
Hollywood.
There is no doubt that colonialism
is alive and well in Hawai‘i. Lorrin
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Thurston, John Stevens, and
W O Smith, the architects of the over-
throw of the Kingdom of Hawai‘i,
have been reincarnated as Harold Rice,
Patrick Barrett, and Earl Arakaki. The
Kamehameha trustees have disap-
pointed the people who look to them
for leadership and passively yielded to
the demands of our adversaries, much
like the cabinet that abandoned our
last queen, Lili‘uokalani, in her hour
of need. As I write this, America is
celebrating its Independence Day
(July 4). Will the Hawaiian people
once again be able to celebrate their
Independence Day? Or, will history
repeat itself and relinquish the Hawai-
ian Nation to a footnote in history?
tracie ku‘uipo cummings
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Ma¯ori Issues
In a year dominated by the approach-
ing general election, Mäori have
watched the government, including
Mäori members of parliament, steer
away from any public debate on
Mäori issues. In recent years, Mäori
members have come under sustained
attack from the conservative opposi-
tion and the mainstream media when-
ever they have attempted to articulate
Mäori aspirations for greater control
over their lives. Calls from non-Mäori
lending support to those aspirations
generally receive little or no media
coverage. So on Waitangi Day in Feb-
ruary 2002, when Päkehä groups at
Waitangi, including the Green Party,
publicly stated their support for Mäori
sovereignty, it went unreported in
mainstream media. Several days later
it was partially reported when the
Green’s leader signaled a softening 
of the stance on Mäori sovereignty
because “many people find the term
very frightening.” Yet even the Min-
istry for Mäori Development, Te Puni
Kökiri, advocated restructuring local
government to ensure that Mäori
have greater control over their own
affairs. In the final weeks before the
July 2002 election, as right-wing par-
ties were attacking the Treaty of Wai-
tangi and promoting a cut-off date for
all Mäori claims against the Crown,
the largest mainstream newspaper ran
a story on Mäori views of Mäori sov-
ereignty. It had to admit that a signifi-
cant number of Mäori interviewed
wanted Mäori sovereignty recognized,
yet the article concentrated on report-
ing Mäori giving reasons for why it
should not be recognized.
Mainstream media coverage of
Mäori issues has continued to be a
matter of concern on several occasions
in the past year. Claims that the media
were Mäori bashing surfaced on sev-
eral occasions. A television documen-
tary on the “Treaty Industry” inter-
viewed a disgruntled historian and
two disaffected former employees of
the Crown Forestry Rental Trust, a
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body that administers many millions
of dollars of rental paid on Crown-
owned forests, and allocates some of
its income towards the research and
settlement of Mäori claims to those
forests. The trust has been under
investigation by the Mäori Affairs
select committee for corruption. The
television program sensationalized an
alleged “Mäori mafia” and attempted
to blame Mäori for the parlous state
of the settlements. Of the 908 claims
registered with the Waitangi Tribunal
over the past twenty-six years, fewer
than 20 have resulted in any land
being returned to the claimants or
compensation being paid out. Further-
more, not a single claimant group has
received all the land and compensa-
tion they are entitled to. In the past
year the Labour-led coalition govern-
ment has partially settled just one
claim, that of Ngati Tama in the 
Taranaki region—where, the tribunal
stated in its 1996 report, Mäori had
suffered a holocaust. Ngati Tama lost
more than 30,000 hectares. The set-
tlement returns just 1,870 hectares
and 14.5 million dollars. The three
other settlements achieved under the
present government have been simi-
larly mean-spirited.
Yet the “Treaty Industry” television
program made no mention of the real
reasons for the chronically slow and
inadequate process of treaty claims
settlement. The main reason is that
every government in power over the
past decade has refused to take any
Mäori advice on the need to radically
reformulate its unfair and unjust set-
tlement policy. Then there is the
ongoing underfunding of the Waitangi
Tribunal. There is also the pivotal role
of the “experts” in the industry—the
lawyers, historians, and government
bureaucrats who seem content to pro-
long the process and charge exorbitant
fees for as long as they can. The over-
whelming majority of these people are
non-Mäori. Despite its lack of fund-
ing, the Waitangi Tribunal has inter-
vened to try to speed up its hearings
and reporting process, fast-tracking
the Gisborne district hearings through
in seven months in contrast to others
that have taken more than four years.
The media coverage of the kidnap-
ping of the eight-month-old daughter
of a lawyer and a High Court judge,
both of whom are Mäori, caused fur-
ther consternation. The fact that the
child had been adopted from within
the couple’s extended family according
to Mäori custom was incomprehensi-
ble to mainstream media. Several
newspapers tried to imply that Mäori
were somehow to blame for the kid-
napping, despite Mäori protestations
to the contrary. Yet when the baby
was found and the kidnapper arrested
and sent to jail for eleven years, there
was very little discussion of the fact
that he was Päkehä and that his sole
motivation for the kidnapping was
money.
Mäori views of the bombing of the
World Trade Center in New York on
September 11th were also ignored
until the initial furor began to die
down. While Mäori were appalled at
the incident, they were not surprised.
Mäori radio stations interviewed
Mäori elders from around the country,
many of them ex-servicemen, shortly
after the bombing. All of the elders
expressed views that the United States
could not keep attacking and making
war on other nations without expect-
ing some form of retaliation. It was
several days before similar views
started to surface in the mainstream
political reviews • polynesia 185
media, and the Green Party went on
record as opposing New Zealand
troops being sent to Afghanistan.
In the 2000–2001 reporting period,
the country’s largest newspaper had
run a campaign against Tainui. This
year it was the turn of Mäori televi-
sion to be targeted, with the New
Zealand Herald listing no fewer than
eighty articles on its website (the same
number listed for Tainui last year).
Criticism of Mäori television has been
going on for more than six years, as
mainstream media backed by govern-
ment officials ignore Court of Appeal
rulings and battle to keep Mäori out
of the industry. When the chairman 
of the Mäori channel’s board attacked
the media for Mäori bashing in April,
they retaliated by closely scrutinizing
all the workings of the channel. When
they discovered that the Canadian
chief executive officer had falsified his
qualifications, the number of articles
per day attacking Mäori television
peaked. The day after the board
sacked the officer, ten articles, includ-
ing an editorial, ran in the New Zea-
land Herald. The media appeared to
be rather stunned, however, when the
officer was subsequently jailed for six
months and denied bail, a punishment
that legal experts saw as fitting the
crime. Then the Herald was silenced
completely by the appointment in
May of an interim chief executive
officer, who is one of the very few
Mäori millionaires and a very experi-
enced businessman. He refused to
speak to any mainstream media and
in interviews with Mäori media said
he was not interested in anything that
the mainstream media had to say.
The one Mäori member of parlia-
ment prepared to take on the main-
stream media, Tariana Turia, did so in
March 2002, referring to the media as
“hysterical, hostile and ill-informed”
over her reference to a Mäori holo-
caust in 2000. She predicted that the
media would attack her during the
campaign for the 2002 general elec-
tions. Her prediction appears to have
been sufficient to stop them from
doing so. Turia traveled around the
country attending many Mäori gath-
erings (hui), including those organized
in different tribal regions for ministers
of the Crown to meet Mäori in their
own territories. Although the media
attended such events, they were not
interested in what Mäori were saying
there. Requests to the prime minister
during these hui to be more outspoken
in support of Mäori drew the response
that whenever she did say such things
to the media, they did not report them.
In the main she considered that the
media were only looking for incidents
that would allow them to report
Mäori negatively.
Yet there were also the occasional
bright patches. In February, the film
of the Mäori-language version of
Shakespeare’s The Merchant of 
Venice played to rapturous audiences
throughout the country. Despite the
historic and cultural importance of
the piece, in particular because of the
endangered state of the Mäori lan-
guage, it received minimal media
coverage. Yet a four-star rating and an
excellent review from a Päkehä film
critic appeared in the New Zealand
Herald. Massey University later con-
ferred an honorary doctorate on the
producer, Don Selwyn, for his many
years of stage, television, and film
work, and his training and mentoring
of young talent.
And then in May, a tribal radio
station topped the ratings to become
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Auckland’s most-preferred radio sta-
tion. Ngati Whatua’s mai fm caters
to Mäori and Pacific Islander youth
and features rap music, rhythm and
blues, jazz, hip-hop, and more
recently, New Zealand–produced
music. While its popularity had dis-
placed mainstream radio stations in
the polls, it follows naturally from 
the fact that among the population in
Auckland who are twenty-five years
of age and under, 20 percent are
Pacific Islanders and 16 percent are
Mäori. That, and the fact that a sur-
vey of mai fm listeners indicates that
they don’t watch television because it
does not reflect them. Likewise main-
stream advertising.
Although the prime minister
claimed to be supportive of Mäori,
her apologies to non-Mäori sectors of
the New Zealand society drew some
bitter responses from Mäori. In Feb-
ruary 2002 she apologized to the Chi-
nese community who were forced to
pay a poll tax from 1881 until 1944.
Then in June she apologized to the
Samoan community for the New Zea-
land government’s role in allowing the
introduction of a devastating influenza
epidemic in 1918 and the gunning
down of Mau protestors in 1929. Yet
Mäori have yet to receive any overall
apology for their on-going ill treat-
ment at the hands of successive colo-
nial governments and the numerous
breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi
perpetrated against them. Mäori com-
mentators noted that while the prime
minister was apologizing to others,
Mäori on the East Coast were pro-
testing to stop their lands being sold
to American developers, Mäori elders
in Northland were being arrested for
attempting to defend their sacred sites,
the police in Whängarei were being
repeatedly criticized by the courts for
their treatment of Mäori youth, the
chief justice sent a Waitara policeman
to the High Court to defend a charge
of murdering a young Mäori student,
Raglan police were criticized by a
district court judge for chasing two
Mäori onto a marae and scuffling with
them inside the sacred meeting house,
and a conviction for not giving a name
and address to a policeman was over-
turned by the High Court when it
ruled that it is not an offense to answer
a policeman in Mäori, one of the two
official languages of New Zealand.
Yet the government is well aware
that Mäori receive unfair treatment.
Apart from its own Closing the Gaps
reports highlighting the huge and
growing disparities between Mäori
and non-Mäori achievement, its report
on the tertiary education sector has
resulted in tertiary institutions being
warned that unless the recruitment,
retention, and completion rates for
Mäori improve markedly, they will be
stripped of some of their government
funding. Yet local government reforms
did almost nothing to address the lack
of roading, water supply, electricity,
housing, and basic living standards for
many rural Mäori communities. Apol-
ogies and remedies for all of these and
many other indignities still suffered by
Mäori are long overdue.
It is doubtful that the answer to
Mäori difficulties lies within the exist-
ing parliamentary system. In June the
prime minister announced that the
country would go to a general elec-
tion four months early, at the end 
of July. The main election issues for
Mäori were treaty settlements, educa-
tion, and housing. Genetic modifica-
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tion of crops is also an issue, with
Mäori largely opposed to it. The
apparent lack of performance of
many Mäori members of parliament
was another issue. One commentator
noted that of the sixteen Mäori mem-
bers in the last parliament, fewer than
six could be relied on to advocate for
Mäori and only one, Tariana Turia,
was prepared to fight publicly in sup-
port of Mäori issues. The poor perfor-
mance was not unexpected, given the
severe attacks from both the media
and conservative opposition parties
on any outspoken Mäori members
and the fact that party loyalties have
effectively prevented their acting as a
single bloc.
Yet the July 2002 elections saw a
record number of 20 Mäori members
in a parliament of 120, with 11 repre-
senting their own electorates and the
rest as list members for their parties.
But none of these were independents.
All 7 Mäori electorate seats remained
with Labour, with the Labour Mäori
caucus at a record 10 members within
the full Labour caucus of 52. Yet
despite the strong Mäori numbers,
shortly after the elections the Mäori
caucus indicated that it was requesting
just three ministerial appointments
inside cabinet and three outside cabi-
net in what it appears will be a
Labour-led minority government.
Of the remaining parties, the tradi-
tional mainstream conservative party,
National, returned only 27 members,
with their vote dissipated among
right-wing minor parties. Only 2 of
their members are Mäori. Of the other
three right-wing parties represented in
the house, New Zealand First gained
13 seats, while act and United
Futures each gained 9. The New
Zealand First party is led by a Mäori,
the charismatic Winston Peters, and
despite a general impression that he is
Mäori bashing, 6 of his 13 members
are Mäori. act has 1 Mäori member,
while United Futures has none. The
left-leaning Green Party gained only 
8 seats, 1 of which went to a Mäori.
The Progressive Coalition has 2 mem-
bers, neither of whom are Mäori. 
At the time of writing, Labour had
entered negotiations with both the
Greens and United Future about the
composition of the next government.
margaret mutu
Tonga
The triennial general election was held
again in March 2002. Democracy
supporters claimed that their win of
seven of the nine People’s Represen-
tatives’ seats was a conclusive victory
for the movement throughout the
kingdom. Other observers did not
find the outcome so clear-cut. 
The Tonga Human Rights and
Democracy Movement (thrdm),
which was formed in 1998 to replace
the Pro-Democracy Movement, did
not formally field candidates for the
election because, as it claims to be
merely a mass movement that seeks
political change, the conditions under
which it receives funding from various
overseas agencies prevent it from
doing so (M T, May 2002, 12–16 ).
After the outcome, however, the move-
ment was quick to claim a win. The
most vocal of its representatives—
‘Akilisi Pohiva, Dr Feleti Sevele, and
‘Isileli Pulu, who became the Tonga-
tapu No 1, No 2, and No 3 People’s
Representatives respectively—claimed
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that the result represented a mandate
from the people to institute the gov-
ernment restructure that had formed
the basis of their campaign. This idea,
namely, that all thirty members of the
Legislative Assembly (from which the
monarch would still appoint his cabi-
net ministers) be elected by common
roll, has been previously aired, dis-
cussed, and defeated in parliament 
in 1992. Although the idea appeared
better understood by the electorate
than previously, especially in Tonga-
tapu, there is little evidence that the
idea was the primary factor that
swayed the voters there or in the
other island groups. Indeed, pro-
government supporters (notably the
minister for police, the Honourable
Clive Edwards, and Tuisoso, the edi-
tor of the government owned and
controlled newspaper, Kalonikali 
[The Tonga Chronicle]) disagreed,
and argued that the results merely
reflected the usual contest for votes
between individuals to see who 
would enter parliament. They further
asserted that it was conducted in the
older-style fashion of personalized
politics, rather than as an ideological
battle over ideas that remain poorly
understood by the mass of people.
However, these arguments prove
rather equivocal, as in several cases
the personalized issues tended to
coincide with principles.
Three commoners’ seats are allo-
cated for Tongatapu, two for each of
the Ha‘apai and Vava‘u groups, and
one each for the Niuas and ‘Eua. If
the result was a nationwide mandate
for change, however, it is noteworthy
that the voter turnout was the lowest
(44.3 percent) in Tongatapu and only
49 percent in the country overall. The
smaller islands had higher turnouts:
Ha‘apai and Vava‘u each had 53 per-
cent, and the Niuas and ‘Eua had 69
percent and 56 percent respectively.
While it is always more difficult to say
why people did not vote rather than
why they did, the Tongatapu reaction
suggests that either a high proportion
of registered voters were overseas, or
they preferred not to vote because of
disenchantment with the candidates
or perhaps the whole idea of politics.
It should be noted also that the
lead-up to the elections was marked
by several disconcerting events. One
of the most unprecedented was New
Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs
Phil Goff ’s attacks on the Tongan
government’s credibility. He suggested
in a series of remarks that the level of
corruption and the failure to uphold
the constitutional rights of its citizens,
along with the fact that no major
political change was in the offing,
might affect the future level of New
Zealand aid. The Tongan government
regarded this interference in its inter-
nal affairs as an impingement on the
nation’s sovereignty and an attempt to
bias the outcome of the forthcoming
election. There was also some sugges-
tion in the local press that Goff ’s
remarks were prompted by Pohiva’s
ongoing efforts to engage the sympa-
thies and actions of larger neighbor-
ing Pacific Rim countries for his polit-
ical ends (TC, 9 March 2002, 1). 
Another matter that arose was the
amount and source of the king’s pri-
vate funds. The issue came closely on
the heels of the Tonga Trust debacle,
in which us$20 million appeared to
have gone missing as a result of a
series of dubious investment maneu-
vers (or a long-term scam) on the part
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of the fund’s advisor, J D Bognadoff.
Bognadoff is a US citizen who first
claimed the king’s attention in the
role of court jester. The trust’s lack of
proper administration by the two cab-
inet ministers placed in charge of it—
the Honourable K T Fakafanua (the
former minister of finance) and the
Honourable T Tupou (the former
deputy prime minister, attorney gen-
eral, and minister of justice)—resulted
in their resignations from office in
September 2001. The loss of the
money invested with a US-based
company, Millennium Assets Manage-
ment, was confirmed in a report to
the Tongan government on 7 June
2002, following ten months of specu-
lation about its fate. After investiga-
tions in the United States by Auditor
General Pohiva Tu‘i‘ionetoa, the
trustees have instructed a team of San
Francisco lawyers to commence legal
proceedings against Bognadoff and
two others. The trust has claims
against six companies alleged to have
been involved in the transference of
the money, some of which relate to
failure to pay or default on payment
of a promissory note, fraud, conspir-
acy, aiding and abetting fraud, negli-
gent misrepresentation, material
misrepresentation, and fraudulent
conversion (TC, 13 June 2002, 17). 
It now remains to be seen who, if
anyone, laughs over the loss to the
kingdom of t$50 million.
While this was going on, Ko e
Kelea, the radical newssheet now
edited by Pohiva’s son, published a
letter allegedly written by a former
palace secretary stating that the king
had a personal fortune of us$350
million. In an interview, the king freely
admitted that he has a bank account
in Hawai‘i in which he invests the
proceeds from his vanilla production
but that the amount is not near the
one quoted. The letter involved an
allegedly forged signature, however,
and the week before the election,
police raided Pohiva’s home and the
thrdm office and confiscated a hard
disk on which a copy of the letter was
allegedly found. Some people felt that
this find might promote a conserva-
tive vote, but in the event, the harsh
treatment meted out to Pohiva, his
son and daughter, and ‘Isisleli Pulu, a
thrdm office-bearer, appears to have
swung voters toward the movement.
In another landmark development
following the election, Pohiva and his
son were charged with sedition, fraud,
and defamation, and Pulu with fraud.
If these two members of parliament
are convicted of criminal charges later
this year, they stand to lose their seats.
In the Tongatapu elections, 14,734
people actually voted from a roll of
33,232 people registered. Of these,
Pohiva romped home with 9,437
votes, scoring electoral victories at all
polling stations, to return as the Ton-
gatapu No 1 People’s Representative
as he has for the last twelve of the
fifteen years since he was first elected
to parliament in 1987. Dr Fred Sevele
was returned for a second term as the
Tongatapu No 2 People’s Representa-
tive with 8,498 votes, and newcomer
Pulu came into the No 3 place with
5,500 votes. In Ha‘apai, a democracy
supporter, Teisina Fuko, was ousted,
and newcomer Fineasi Funaki became
the No 1 People’s Representative. The
longtime thrdm parliamentarian,
‘Uliti Uata, came back in the No 2
Ha‘apai position. In the Niuas, a
reputed thrdm supporter, Sione
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Haukinima, was newly elected, and 
in ‘Eua, another thrdm supporter,
Sunia Fili, was returned to parlia-
ment. Vava‘u, however, voted in two
newcomers who oppose the Tonga
Human Rights and Democracy Move-
ment, with Trevor Guttenbeil and
‘Etuate Lavulavu taking the No 1 and
No 2 People’s Representatives’ seats
respectively. Lavulavu has remarked
that the monarchical form of govern-
ment was ordained by God for Tonga,
which goes some way toward explain-
ing why it might prove difficult for
Tonga to transform itself into a
western-style democracy.
Perhaps the only way to test
Pohiva’s and Sevele’s claim that peo-
ple voted overwhelmingly for their
proposed government restructure is 
to conduct a referendum on the issue.
But this would have to be carried out
by the government because the cost 
is beyond the means of the Tonga
Human Rights and Democracy Move-
ment. It would also be difficult to
work out what questions to put to 
the people.
As matters stand, it is also difficult
to separate ideological from personal-
ized issues in the case of the more
radical supporters. All commentators
agree that people across the social
spectrum vote for Pohiva because he
leaks government business to the peo-
ple. There is a degree of corruption,
nepotism, and cronyism in middle-
level management that many govern-
ment employees resent but feel power-
less to address. Also, although the
Tongan people remain loyal to their
monarch, many people were privately
incensed at his remark that his
children have the same rights as
everyone else in the country to build
up their business interests. This fails
to acknowledge the extreme social and
cultural advantages they possess. In
addition, they have picked the plum
opportunities that rely on common
property rights of all citizens: through
her company, Tongasat, the Princess
Royal controls the ownership of
Tonga’s orbital slots, and through his
company, Shoreline, the Crown Prince
now has a monopoly on the genera-
tion and distribution of Tonga’s power
supply. Through a fully owned sub-
sidiary company, Tonfon, the Crown
Prince also expects shortly to intro-
duce wireless technology to compete
with the existing government-owned
Tonga Telecommunications Corpora-
tion. These moves indicate to ordinary
people how the most privileged cash
in on their country’s common heritage
and resources. They rely on ‘Akilisi to
give vent to their concerns in parlia-
ment, and to continue his tireless fight
for public accountability and trans-
parency. Sevele is a smart, educated,
and successful businessman who, it is
hoped, might improve people’s liveli-
hoods through support of private-
sector development and the removal
of the government’s heavy hand over
much business enterprise. Pulu might
have received a sympathy vote over
his police detention in regard to the
alleged forged letter, and might also
have gained from the lack of a strong
opposition figure. ‘Esau Namoa, the
previous Tongatapu No 3 People’s
Representative and a popular young
businessman, was disqualified from
the election for not paying a govern-
ment-imposed fine.
In Ha‘apai, it is hard to distinguish
the ideological thrdm element from
the fact that both of the successful
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candidates are also well known as
“helping men.” Funaki, for example,
had distributed school supplies to the
tiny atolls that make up the middle
group for a good two years before 
the election, and when Cyclone Waka
struck in February 2002, he was
instrumental in getting utilities
restored and relief supplies sent to
stricken households. Uata has always
gained local support because he runs
a fleet of interisland cargo vessels and
thus provides a service to the commu-
nity. In the Niuas, the strength of
Haukinima’s loyalty to the Tonga
Human Rights and Democracy Move-
ment is untested, while Fili for ‘Eua,
like others, at times wavers in loyalty
to the movement’s line according to
political interest.
In sum, the mandate for govern-
ment change is not as clear among the
island groups as the Tongatapu repre-
sentatives make out. Many people
believe that no change at all will result,
and even fervent supporters such as
Futa Helu admit that the Tongatapu
representatives will lead the way
towards reform in the next three years,
and that the other pro-democratic
People’s Representatives will follow
them (Taumu‘a Lelei, April 2002,
22–23). This is far from the claim
that all seven thrdm supporters
among the nine People’s Representa-
tives share the same degree of com-
mitment to its ideals and goals. Thus,
it is also too soon to claim a victory
for democracy. In advocating the
thirty-elected-member legislature, the
Tonga Human Rights and Democracy
Movement, in addition to account-
ability and transparency, is valuably
advancing another democratic theme
—namely, the greater representation
of commoners in parliamentary deci-
sion making. Even if these aspects of
good governance were advanced under
the rubric of democratic reform, how-
ever, it would be wrong to mistake
them for a step toward full represen-
tative democracy. 
Despite the cries from the hustings
in March, many people in Tonga still
believe fundamental changes in poli-
tics, as in other social and cultural
affairs, will emanate from the top, that
is, from the government headed by the
reigning monarch. On 9 August 2001,
the principles of accountability and
transparency appeared to have been
wonderfully promoted when the prime
minister announced the appointment
of a commissioner of public relations
to hear cases of abuse and misappro-
priation of power. The initiative
received the highest praise from the
People’s Representatives. Teisina Fuko,
the member for Ha‘apai, for example,
raved that “hrh the prime minister’s
ready agreement for the [appointment]
demonstrates his strong support for
the public to be aware of what Gov-
ernment does. . . . This is an excep-
tional achievement in our attempt to
bring about better performance and
more honesty in Government” (TC,
23 August 2001, 5). Since then,
nothing more has been reported of the
commissioner’s activities. In another
move, the government, with the help
of a loan from the Asian Develop-
ment Bank, has recently begun to
reduce and restructure the civil service.
Top-level meetings have been held, but
members of the public have not been
invited as participants or observers.
Once more, the well-meaning but
extremely paternalistic attitude that
“government knows best” has pre-
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vailed. In the absence of facts, rumors
abound with regard to the way the
downsizing of the public service will
take place, and many civil servants
are at present restless and distressed,
as they are unsure of their future and
remain in the dark about the circum-
stances of their employment.
kerry james
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Wallis and Futuna
On 29 November 2001, French Over-
seas Secretary of State Christian Paul
went to Wallis, where he declared: 
“I intend that the assistance of France
shall not slacken.” He confirmed the
future opening of a vocational train-
ing center and the future implementa-
tion of a statute for members of par-
liament. He proposed the creation of
a development council made up of all
the local decision makers. In Decem-
ber, it was Didier Quentin, overseas
secretary-general of the Rassemble-
ment pour la République (rpr), and
Pierre Frogier, president of the gov-
ernment of New Caledonia (of the
party, Rassemblement pour La Calé-
donie dans la République [rpcr]),
who went to Wallis to take their turn
in preparing for the upcoming elec-
tions. The signing of the special agree-
ment between the French Overseas
Territory of Wallis and Futuna and
the French Overseas Country of New
Caledonia was once again postponed.
In the meantime a guidance document
on economic development was signed
in Paris on 22 January 2002 between
the state and the territory in the pres-
ence of customary leaders. This docu-
ment was to be followed by a pro-
gram contract along with a significant
financial initiative.
The year 2002 was significant on
the electoral level. First, the election
in a single ballot of the twenty territo-
rial advisers took place on 10 March.
Thirty-two lists, bringing together a
total of 134 candidates, were submit-
ted to 9,353 voters. Of those eligible,
82.7 percent voted. Spoiled ballot
papers accounted for 0.75 percent,
and 9.8 percent were proxy votes. The
elections yielded a right-wing majority
affiliated to the national rpr party.
On 26 March, Patalione Kanimoa was
reelected president of the territorial
parliament by 12 votes to 7, with one
member absent for health reasons.
The opposition unified for the election
of the committee of the territorial
parliament, in spite of the fact that it
included as many right-wing personal-
ities (eg, Soane Uhila) as left-wing
elected officials (eg, Donald Mercier). 
The 5 May 2002 election of
Jacques Chirac as president of the
French Republic facilitated the reelec-
tion of the rpr member of parliament
of Wallis and Futuna. At the time of
the parliamentary elections in June,
outgoing Deputy Victor Brial was
opposed by four other candidates. His
two main opponents (Soane Uhila and
Kamilo Gata) did not come forward
as candidates, but they supported
Penisio Tialetagi, a tradesman whose
campaign speech privileged the per-
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sonalization of the (“anti-Brialism”)
debate. Brial, the candidate of the
Union pour la Majorité Presidentielle
(ump), benefited in the second ballot
from the partial transfer of Apeleto
Likuvalu’s votes, although he only won
by 58 votes. For the first time, Gaston
Lutui, a Wallisian known for his very
diverse political career, came forward
as candidate for the National Front
(fn), an extreme right-wing national
party. However, he did not manage to
capitalize on the 492 votes that had
gone to the national leader of this
party at the time of the presidential
election. 
With regard to New Caledonia, 
the political authorities of Wallis and
Futuna consider that the expatriate
community must be especially careful
and discrete. Under the care of the
Rassemblement Démocratique
Océanien (rdo), a party affiliated to
the Front de Libération Nationale
Kanak Socialiste (flnks), and with
the participation of a socialist party
executive from France, a day of reflec-
tion in August 2001 brought together
about sixty young Caledonians of
Wallisian and Futunian origin. On 
11 October, about fifteen Caledonian
pupils of Wallisian and Futunian
origin destroyed the office of the
headmaster of a Catholic technical
school in Bourail. Indeed, at the end
of August abusive graffiti by young
people from a nearby tribe had called
for the departure of this community.
The culprits were not punished.
Thanks to the arrival of Wallis and
Futuna’s senator, calm returned after
a customary ceremony of forgiveness.
On 13 November 2001, another
problem arose in Saint-Louis: young
Wallisian and Futunians set up road
blocks following the previous day’s
stoning by Melanesians of a school
bus bringing Polynesian children back
to the Wallisian and Futunian hamlet
of Ave Maria. This dispute worsened
on 10 December when several dwell-
ings were set on fire, and inhabitants
of Ave Maria and members of the
Melanesian tribe of Saint-Louis were
injured by gunfire. The long-dormant
problem erupted following a rapid
increase in the population of Ave
Maria and with the appearance of a
gang of idle and violent youths on the
Saint-Louis side. On 3 February 2002,
young Jean-Marie Goyetta died as a
result of his wounds. On 10 June, a
thirty-six-year-old Wallisian, Petelo
Motuku, was killed by a sniper as he
was setting off for work in his car.
Paradoxically, this new drama reduced
the tension, and the high commis-
sioner then managed to set up the
mediation system greatly desired by
the various communities. This serious
business had few direct effects on
Wallis and Futuna, but it accentuated
the unease felt by expatriate Wallis-
ians and Futunians in New Caledonia.
Administratively, the recurring
debate on the evolution of the statute
of 1961 was kept alive by Senator
Robert Laufoaulu and the state ser-
vices. Indeed, the French government’s
desire was to give the elected officials
a sense of responsibility on all levels,
and more particularly to support
greater autonomy for the three French
political entities located in the South
Pacific. The statute problem came up
in the context of a debate about the
place of the traditional chieftaincy in
institutions, and also concerning the
choice of competencies to be trans-
ferred. 
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The economy of Wallis and Futuna
still depends on direct or indirect
transfers from France. In July 2001,
the multisector guaranteed minimum
wage was raised to fcfp 70,000,
which is much higher than in other
countries in the region, yet less than
that paid in France. In this regard, the
president of the territorial parliament
noted that there was “a change of
mentality. Wallisians are gradually
changing their way of life, their eating
habits, their dress, and also their way
of thinking. There is now a lot of
demand on behalf of the population,
which is very new” (Te Fenua Fo‘ou,
no. 292). 
A third merchant ship now brings
freight to Mata-Utu. Operated by the
Sofrana company, the one-hundred-
six-meter-long Sofrana Bligh makes a
three-week run starting in New Zea-
land and calling at Tonga, Samoa,
Wallis, and finally Futuna.
The problem of a special interisland
ferry service is still unresolved. The
chieftaincies of Futuna wanted a
financial arrangement based on 9 per-
cent participation for each of the three
districts, and 24 percent for the terri-
tory, with private shareholders holding
49 percent of the capital. The state
imposed an arrangement based on a
51 percent participation of the terri-
tory supplemented by 5 percent par-
ticipation per district. 
The Société Industrielle of Wallis
and Futuna, the only real processing
plant specializing in the manufacture
of sheet metal and aluminum joinery,
asked for an increase of 20 percent on
customs taxes in its sphere of activity. 
Tourism remains underdeveloped,
although thirty-six sailing ships
anchored in the territory in 2001, with
only seventeen flying the French flag.
On average, stopovers are five days.
In January 2002, reinforcement work
and a hundred-meter extension of the
runway of Hihifo international air-
port were completed so that the island
could receive a320 airbuses.
There were two noteworthy cul-
tural exhibitions in July 2001. One
was devoted to the individuals who
were influential during Wallis and
Futuna’s first forty years as an over-
seas territory; the other commemo-
rated eighty years of local philately.
At the same time, various cultural
events emphasized the significant
Wallisian and Futunian community of
New Caledonia, which sometimes led
to sharp reactions from certain Mela-
nesian pro-independence political
leaders. On one occasion, sixty-three
Futunian dancers and craftsmen went
to Noumea and an exhibition cata-
logue, covering 3,000 years of history,
took stock of the prehistoric period in
Wallis and Futuna. 
On 8 March, the editor in chief of
the weekly Te Fenua Fo‘ou was called
to a hearing by the lavelua (king),
Tomasi Kulimoetoke. As the king
refused the editor’s right to evoke the
follow-up to the Make Pilioko affair,
his interpreter declared that “if the
newspaper continued to work in this
way, the Lavelua would have the
newspaper shut down.” The following
week, the puluiuvea (customary min-
ister of the police force) ordered the
equipment belonging to the manager,
Michel Bodineau, confiscated or
destroyed. Bodineau managed to
publish a last edition (no. 326 ) in
Noumea before declaring his company
bankrupt. The headline of the last
editorial read: “Absolute Monarchy
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or French Banana Republic?” In
Wallis, 700 copies of the headline
were distributed and in New Cale-
donia, 800 copies. 
In April, the Oceania Customs
Organization was the first interna-
tional conference to be hosted by
Mata-Utu. Regarding religion, a note-
worthy event was the translation of
the New Testament (Ko le Tausifo‘ou)
into Futunian. 
Groups of affiliated trade unions of
France continued to train their mem-
bers on the other side of the world.
The Force Ouvrière trade union sent a
training officer for a week in August
2001. In sports, men’s cricket (kilikiti)
is again in fashion in the district of
Mua. 
Lastly, on the customary level, in
September 2001 Soane Patita Suve
became Tui Toafa, that is, the new
chief of the village of Mala‘e. In
October, Mikaele Holoia became Utu-
maka, the chief of one of the halves
of Vailala village. In November,
Keleto Lakalaka again became Tui
Uvea, chief of Te‘esi. In January 2002,
Petelo Ponoso was established as Eva,
the title of the chief of Utufua.
frédéric angleviel
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